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Taming Troubled Waters: Joint
Development of Oil and Mineral
Resources in Overlapping Claim Areas
MARK J. VALENCIA*
Many offshore areas with mineral or petroleum potential are
claimed by more than one nation. Joint development is an arrange-
ment by which such nations can avoid questions of sovereignty
through joint exploration and development of any resource in an
agreed area. Frequently appearing elements in precedents for joint
development include: the extent of the area; the contract type; fi-
nancial arrangements; the process of selection of concessionaires
or operators; the length of the agreement; and the nature and
functions of the joint management body. Geology plays a funda-
mental role in the selection and evolution of joint development
agreements. The success of joint development agreements is de-
pendent on the given knowledge of actual deposits, good political
relations, practical mindedness, and cooperative private
companies.
INTRODUCTION
With the extension of jurisdiction over resources and certain
activities to 200 nautical miles or more, many seabed areas
became subject to overlapping claims. The expectation of en-
larged resource bases stimulated the extended maritime jurisdiction
movement; these expectations were justified. Known re-
sources include deep-water oil and gas,1 cobalt-rich manganese
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1. Considerable petroleum potential remains to be discovered on the continental
shelves and in deeper water on the continental slope and rises of the marginal basins
bordering the major circum-Pacific land masses, and perhaps behind the small island
arcs in the western and southwestern Pacific. Further potential exists in pre-Tertiary
sediments underlying already productive basins, and in gas hydrates (gas and water in
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crusts, 2 polymetallic sulfide deposits,3 and manganese nodules.4
the solid state) in sediments in deep water. These gas hydrates may also form an imper-
meable seal capping more gas and oil.
The estimated total gross value of undiscovered oil and gas resources in Southeast Asia
ranges from 1.1 trillion to 11 trillion dollars, in Northeast Asia from 0.4 trillion to four
trillion dollars, and in Oceania from 0.5 trillion to six trillion dollars. This estimate for
Oceania does not include resources expected in Tonga, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands,
and most important, Papua-New Guinea, all of which could be worth as much as another
trillion dollars. By comparison, the United States Pacific area, including Alaska, might
harbor 0.3 trillion dollars worth of oil and gas. Valencia & Marsh, Southeast Asia Ex-
tended Maritime Jurisdiction and Development, 3 MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS
(1986); R. ROLAND, M. GOUD & B. McGREGOR, THE U.S. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE-A SUMMARY OF ITS GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION. AND RESOURCE POTENTIAL, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 912 (1983); United Nations. Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Symposium on Petroleum Potential in Island Ar-
eas, Small Ocean Basins, Submerged Margins and Related Areas, 1980.
2. Cobalt-rich manganese crusts have been reported from seamounts in the Ha-
waiian and Line Islands at depths between 1100 and 2600 meters. The thickness of
crusts reaches seven to nine centimeters and averages 2.5 centimeters. These crusts con-
tain a mean of 25% manganese, 0.8% cobalt, 0.5% nickel, .07% copper and .0005%
platinum. A seamount may contain between two million and four million tons of crust,
approximating the amount of ore required for a yearly production of a commercial deep-
sea mine. The concentration of cobalt is about one percent greater than cobalt ores
mined on land-and the current market price of cobalt ($27.56/kg) is about five times
that of nickel ($4.98/kg) and 15 times that of copper ($1.77/kg). Total values of cobalt,
nickel, copper, and molybdenum in the mid-Pacific Mountains and Line Islands crusts
from water depths less than 2600 meters, are 170 dollars to 202 dollars per wet ton of
crust or 340 million dollars to 808 million dollars worth of wet ore per deposit, not count-
ing platinum. The exclusive economic zones around the Hawaiian Islands and Johnston
and Palmyra Islands contain an estimated 10 million tons of cobalt, six million tons of
nickel, one million tons of copper and 300 million tons of manganese. A prime mine site
might contain $165/metric ton of cobalt, $37.50/ton of nickel, $1.32/ton of copper and
$43.57/ton of manganese for a total of $247.74/ton of ore, or perhaps four dollars of
gross contained metal value per square meter. See Clark, Johnson & Chin, Assessment
of Cobalt-Rich Manganese Crusts in the Hawaiian, Johnston and Palmyra Islands' Ex-
clusive Economic Zones, 8 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 163 (1984); Halbach, Deep-sea Me-
tallic Deposits, 9 OCEAN MGMT. 35 (1984). Additional deposits have been found in the
Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. Asia and the Pacific, Hono-
lulu Advertiser, Oct. 12, 1985, at BI, col. 1.
3. Marine polymetallic sulfide deposits are located at 2000 meters to 4000 meters
around high-temperature hydrothermal vents in sea-floor spreading centers or mid-ocean
rift zones. Known locations include the Galapagos Ridge, the East Pacific Rise, the
Gorda-Juan de Fuca Ridge System, and the Guaymas Basin. See infra figure accompa-
nying note 5. Recently, deposits have been found off Tonga, in the Lau and North Fiji
basins, and in the Bismark Sea; more are expected. Minerals of commercial interest in-
clude iron, zinc, copper, gold, maganese, platinum, and vanadium. Some deposits contain
up to 21% copper, 50% zinc and 45% iron. See Pacific Island Notes, Honolulu Adver-
tiser, May 7, 1984, at A6, col. 1; Cronan, Metalliferous Sediments in the CCOP/SOPAC
Region of the Southwest Pacific with Particular Reference to Geochemical Exploration
for the Deposits, 4 CCOP/SOPAC TECH. BULL. 8 (1983); NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, MARINE MINERALS: AN ALTERNATIVE MINERAL
SUPPLY 15 (1983).
4. Manganese nodules containing nickel, copper, cobalt, and.manganese had long
been considered the prime economic mineral resource in the deep sea. There are about 10
trillion tons of nodules in the Pacific. However only a small portion of these deposits
contain the economic cutoff percentage of two percent nickel plus copper plus cobalt and
are found in concentrations greater than 10 kg/m2 over an area sufficient for 20 years
production. The highest concentration of nodules (more than 8 kg/m2) with the highest
662
[VOL. 23: 661, 1986] Taming Troubled Waters
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Figure 1
E.- 0- 0M 0 ,..,s
nickel plus copper (at least 1% combined content) are found between 3200 meters and
5900 meters in the northeast Pacific. Mean values of potential mining sites here have the
following ranges: manganese 22% to 27%; nickel 1.2% to 1.4%; copper 0.9% to 1.1%;
cobalt 0.15% to 0.25%. Economic-grade nodule fields have also been reported within the
exclusive economic zone of Mexico. In the South Pacific, nodule distribution is more
irregular; one area of-concentration is around the Manihiki Plateau, the Society Islands,
Tahiti and the Tuamotu Archipelago. More to the south, nodules occur west of the East
Pacific Rise and northeast of New Zealand. Another nodule area lies in the circumpolar
region of Antarctica. In the northern Peru Basin, nodule density is 7 kg/m2 to 14 kg/m2
up to 30 kg/m2 with 1.1% to 1.2% nickel and thus may be of economic interest. Manga-
nese nodules might be mined in the 1990s when economic, technical, legal and political
factors are more favorable. In a first phase of mining, about 0.6 million km2 in the
northeast Pacific nodule belt and two million km2 in the total Pacific may contain fields
of sufficient nodule density, weight and metal content. The in situ reserves amount to 16
billion tons of nodules in the first phase with recoverable reserves of 5.6 billion tons. The
area for each mining site would be between 80,000 km2 and 120,000 km2. There would
be space and abundance for at least 40 to 45 mining sites in the Pacific during a first
generation of deep-sea mining, Halbach, supra note 2, at 42, 45-47, 55-58.
5. Base from Pacific Mineral Resources, in THE RAND McNALLY ATLAS OF THE
Petroleum and mineral resources are likely in some overlap areas,
and the trend is to explore further offshore into such disputed areas.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea6 provides
that, pending agreement on boundary delimitation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, the states concerned
shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements, and in
the meantime, not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final
delimitation.7 International joint development-the setting aside of
the boundary dispute and jointly exploring and developing any re-
sources in an agreed area-is one such provisional arrangement.8
This Article reviews precedents for joint development, defines the es-
sential elements of a joint development agreement, and sketches the
basic parameters of joint development schemes for two areas of over-
lapping claims in Southeast Asia.
OVERLAPPING CLAIMS IN THE PACIFIC REGION
There are at least eight unresolved boundary situations in the
southwest Pacific which might lead to overlaps and controversies,9
especially if mineral deposits are suspected or discovered in these ar-
eas. Between Fiji and Tonga-the frame which was drawn around
the Kingdom of Tonga in 1887, and within which Tonga still claims
all rights--overlaps 4860 nautical square miles of waters and seabed
which Fiji can claim. Also, Tonga's claim to Minerva Reefs as is-
lands would increase Tonga's claimed area by 56,500 nautical square
miles at the expense of 18,500 nautical square miles of Fiji's claimed
area. The boundary between Western Samoa and American Samoa
is unsettled and Western Samoa may not accept Swain;s Island as a
fair basis for restricting its claim in the northeast. Papua-New
Guinea's claim extends east of an equidistance line and enclosed a
6,500 nautical square mile area which could be claimed by the Solo-
mon Islands. A disagreement between New Caledonia and the Solo-
Oceans 164 (M. Bramwell ed. 1977). Distribution of cobalt concentrations and of hydro-
thermal activity and sulphide occurrences from Halbach, supra note 2, at figures 2, 8.
Schematic outline of the exclusive economic zones added by the author.
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.62/122, art. 83(3), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1286 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as LOS Convention].
7. "[P]ending ratification, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of
the final agreement." Id.
8. See generally Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation
Agreements, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 345 (1984).
9. See Prescott, International Maritime Boundaries in the Southwest Pacific
Ocean in LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE PACIFIC BASIN 488
(E. Miles & S. Allen eds. 1981); Prescott, Existing and Potential Maritime Claims in
the Southwest Pacific in 2 OCEAN YEARBOOK 317 (E. Borgese & N. Ginsburg eds.
1980).
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mon Islands would arise if New Caledonia rejected the Solomon Is-
lands' archipelagic baseline around Indispensable Reefs; this would
place the equidistance line thirty nautical miles to the north. A dis-
pute between New Caledonia and Vanuatu may arise over the own-
ership of Hunter and Matthew islands and the 53,800 nautical
square miles of sea and seabed the owner can claim from these is-
lands. There is also a potential problem between New Caledonia and
Australia because of tiny outlying islands that each claim and the
necessity to determine which of these islands is usable as points on
baselines for the determination of the boundaries. Further, The Lord
Howe Rise, on which these islands lie, are separated from the conti-
nental margins of these two countries by deeper areas. The Lord
Howe Rise is thus a continental margin beyond the 200 nautical
mile claims of Australia, New Caledonia, and New Zealand, and
must be divided among them. Also, at least for Australia and New
Zealand, the proceeds of any seabed resources harvested from the
area beyond 200 nautical miles must be shared with the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority.10
There are many areas of unresolved boundaries in Southeast
Asian seas possibly containing petroleum or mineral resources.11
[SEE FIGURE ON NEXT PAGE]
10. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 82.
11. See generally Prescott, Maritime Jurisdictional Boundaries, in MARINE POL-
ICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 64 (G. Kent & M. Valencia eds. 1985).
Figure 212
For example, the area offshore Brunei, claimed also by Malaysia,
China, and Vietnam, and the Arafura Sea areas, claimed by Indone-
sia and Australia, may each contain 300 billion to three trillion dol-
lars worth of oil and gas. The basins in the eastern Gulf of Thailand
claimed by Thailand, Kampuchea and Vietnam, may contain fifty-
three billion to 530 billion dollars worth of oil and gas. The Natuna
area claimed by Vietnam and Indonesia and the Gulf of Tonkin area
claimed by China and Vietnam may contain from twenty-five billion
to 250 billion dollars worth of oil and gas.13
Although these gross values do not include discovery and extrac-
tion costs, their magnitude explains in part why these countries are
adamant about their claims to these areas. However, these countries
rely on foreign private capital, foreign technical expertise and for-
eign equipment for offshore hydrocarbon development, and compa-
nies may be reluctant to invest in hydrocarbon development in dis-
puted areas. Joint development may be an appropriate response to
this dilemma.
12. Valencia, Oil and Gas Potential, Overlapping Claims, and Political Relations,
in MARINE POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, figure 5.4, at 164 (G. Kent & M. Valencia eds.
1985).
13. Valencia & Marsh, supra note 1.
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JOINT DEVELOPMENT IN AREAS OF OVERLAPPING CLAIMS
Joint development agreements between Thailand and Malaysia,1
South Korea and Japan, 15 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,"" and Iceland
and Norway1 7 are sufficiently well documented to delineate elements
in common and their variations. A similar agreement between Sudan
and Saudi Arabia 8 and that recommended for Tunisia and Libya 9
provide supplemental information.
Although Malaysia and Thailand agree on a boundary, extending
approximately fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) from land, from
14. See generally M. VALENCIA, SOUTHEAST ASIAN SEAS: OIL UNDER TROUBLED
WATERS 62 (1985); Ariffin, The Malaysian Philosophy of Joint Development, in GEOL-
OGY AND HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND POSSIBILITIES OF
JOINT DEVELOPMENT 533 (M. Valencia ed. 1985); Polahan, Thailand-Malaysia Memo-
randum of Understanding, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL AND
POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 1355 (M. Valencia ed. 1981).
15. See generally Miyoshi, The Japan-South Korea Agreement of Joint Develop-
ment of the Continental Shelf, in GEOLOGY AND HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL OF THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA AND POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 545 (M. Valencia ed.
1985); Park, Joint Development of Mineral Resources in Disputed Waters: The Case of
Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HYDROCAR-
BON POTENTIAL AND POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 1335 (M. Valencia ed.
1981); Takeyama, Japan's Foreign Negotiations Over Offshore Petroleum Development:
an Analysis of Decision-Making in the Japan-Korea Continental Shelf Joint Develop-
ment Program, in JAPAN AND THE NEW OCEAN REGIME 276 (R. Freidheim ed. 1984);
Miyoshi, Licensing in Japan-South Korea Joint Development Arrangement (a paper
presented at the Third East-West Center Workshop on the Hydrocarbon Potential of the
South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development, Bangkok, Thailand) (Feb.
1985).
16. See generally Onorato, A Case Study in Joint Development The Saudi Ara-
bia-Kuwait Partitioned Neutral Zone, in GEOLOGY AND HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL Or
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 539 (M. Valencia ed.
1985); Fesharaki, Joint Development of Offshore Petroleum Resources: The Persian
Gulf Experience, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL AND POSSIBILI-
TIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 1325 (M. Valencia ed. 1981).
17. See generally Richardson, Anderson & Evensen, Report and Recommenda-
tions to the Governments of Iceland and Norway of the Conciliation Commission on the
Continental Shelf Area Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 20 I.L.M. 797 (1981); estreng,
Reaching Agreement on International Exploitation of Ocean Mineral Resources with
Special Reference to the Joint Development Area Between Jan Mayen and Iceland, in
GEOLOGY AND HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND POSSIBILITIES
OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 555 (M. Valencia ed. 1985).
18. See generally A. EL-HAKIM, THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA 180-88 (1979); Blissenbach & Nawab, Metalliferous Sediments of the Seabed,
in OCEAN YEARBOOK 377 (E. Borgese & N. Ginsburg eds. 1982); Emery, Hunt & Hays,
Summary of Hot Brines and Heavy Metal Deposits in the Red Sea, in HOT BRINES AND
RECENT HEAVY METAL DEPOSITS IN THE RED SEA: A GEOCHEMICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL
ACCOUNT 557 (E. Degens & 0. Ross eds. 1969).
19. See Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
1982 I.C.J. 278, 321 (Judgment of Feb. 24) (Evensen, J., dissenting), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 225, 295 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Tunisia/Libya Continental Shel].
this point their respective boundary claims diverge to the north and
south. The area of overlap is roughly a triangle, athwart the north-
western core of the Malay Basin with its apex pointing towards land.
The overlap area includes a gas discovery by Texas Pacific. A line of
equidistance between Thailand and Malaysia would extend even fur-
ther south than the Thai claim and include another gas discovery,
Pilong 1. Assuming the new Vietnamese government still asserts the
1971 continental shelf claim of South Vietnam, the Vietnamese
claim encompasses the northwestern tip of the area claimed by both
Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand had awarded concessions in the
northeastern part of the disputed area and in the southeastern part
to Triton 1 to Texas Pacific.
On February 21, 1979, the prime ministers of Thailand and Ma-
laysia, General Kriangsak Chomanan and Datuk Hussein Onn,
signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the Malaysia-
Thailand Joint Authority.20 Both governments agreed it was in their
best interests to exploit the resources of the seabed in the area of
overlapping claims as soon as possible. Thus, in a defined Joint De-
velopment Area, they agreed to jointly explore and exploit the sea-
bed and subsoil nonliving resources for a period of fifty years and to
share equally the costs incurred and the benefits derived. During this
time the countries will continue to negotiate the boundary. The
countries ratified the memorandum of understanding by an exchange
of the instruments of ratification on October 24, 1979, creating joint
authority to manage the area.
The South Korea-Japan case has both similarities to and differ-
ences from the Thailand-Malaysia case. Stimulated by a 1969
ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) report
that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of
the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan made overlapping claims to the continental shelf situated be-
tween them.21 These disputes were further complicated by a dispute
between Japan and Taiwan over the Senkaku (or Diaoyutai) islands.
In 1970 Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan agreed to set aside the
boundary issues for future negotiation and to jointly develop any oil
in the overlapping area; however, Chinese protests resulted in the
abandonment of this arrangement. Japan and South Korea then en-
tered into a joint agreement in January 1974. The agreement was
ratified by South Korea in December 1974, but not by Japan until
20. Memorandum of Understanding, Oct. 24, 1979, Malaysia-Thailand, reprinted
in Polahan, supra note 14, at 1356.
21. Emery, Geological Structures and Some Water Characteristics of the East
China Sea and the Yellow Sea, UN ECAFE, Committee for the Co-ordination of Joint
Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas, 1969 TECH. BULL. 2.
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1978.22
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have a joint development zone in the
northeastern corner of the Saudi Arabian peninsula along the east-
ern head of the Persian Gulf. The zone was created in place of a
boundary as a buffer between rival nomadic tribes. The zone lay dor-
mant until the petroleum exploration boom. On June 28, 1948, the
American Independent Oil Company obtained a concession from
Kuwait covering its undivided half of the zone. On February 20,
1949, Pacific Western Oil Corporation, later Getty Oil Company,
acquired a corresponding concession from Saudi Arabia for its undi-
vided half of the zone. Kuwait's "special relationship" with Great
Britain ended in 1961 and on July 7, 1965, the two fully independent
states agreed to formally partition the zone and drew an interna-
tional boundary to divide it equally.23 However, the agreement main-
tained the unified joint development of petroleum reserves in the
zone, as well as the existing rights of the concessionaires.
In February 1979 the Norwegian government declared its right to
establish an EEZ around the island Jan Mayen. Iceland countered
by maintaining that Jan Mayen was a rock, and that under interna-
tional law it could not have a continental shelf or EEZ. Two
problems evolved from negotiations---control of fishing in the area
and continental shelf rights. On May 28, 1980, the parties reached
an agreement in which Iceland recognized Norway's right to an
EEZ around Jan Mayen, while Norway limited the zone to the me-
dian line with Iceland.24 However, the agreement applied mainly to
fish, which explains why the next day Norway declared a 200 nauti-
cal mile zone for fisheries only. Article 9 of the agreement provided
for the establishment of a conciliation commission to make recom-
mendations with regard to a dividing line for the continental shelf.25
The conciliation commission drafted a geological report on the area
involved, resolved various questions of international law, and most
important, recommended a joint development of hydrocarbons in the
area. On October 22, 1982, Iceland and Norway accepted the rec-
22. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, opened
for signature Jan. 30, 1978, Japan-Korea, reprinted in Park, supra note 15, at 1342.
23. Agreement Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone, July 7, 1965, Ku-
wait-Saudi Arabia, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 1134, and in Fesharaki, supra note 16, at 1330.
24. Agreement Concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, May 28,
1980, Iceland-Norway, overenskomster medfremmede stater 912 (1980). See generally
Ostreng, supra note 17.
25. Agreement Concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, supra note
24, art. 9.
ommendations of the conciliation commission.
COMMON ELEMENTS2
6
Common elements in precedents for joint development define the
extent of the area, the contract type, the financial arrangements, the
process of selection of concessionaires or operators, the length of the
agreement, and the nature and functions of the joint management
body. Joint development does not have to be in place of a boundary;
indeed the parties agreed to boundaries in the land portion of the
Saudi Arabia-Kuwait arrangement, 27 in the Saudi Arabia-Sudan
agreements, 28 and between the respective continental shelves and
EEZs in the Iceland-Norway arrangement. 29 Nevertheless, an agree-
ment on the extent of the area in question is fundamental to a joint
development arrangement. In the Thailand-Malaysia s and South
Korea-Japan 3 cases, boundary delimitation was shelved and the
area of overlap of the respective claims became the agreed joint de-
velopment area. In the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait case, the land portion
of the joint development area was originally a neutral zone estab-
lished as a buffer to prevent clashes of nomadic tribes.32 In 1965 the
countries agreed to a boundary and partitioned the zone; however,
the partitioned zone (the area covered by the neutral zone before
partition) became the joint development area. The two countries did
not partition the submerged area adjoining the partitioned zone but
agreed to joint exploration outside territorial seas of six nautical
miles.
In the Iceland-Norway case, the countries based the recommended
joint development area on the extent of the prospective sediments.
This area covers seventy percent of the Norwegian side of an agreed
EEZ boundary.33 An interesting variation is the recommendation
that if a field extends outside the joint development area into the
Icelandic shelf, then Iceland should have sole rights to that portion
in its territory, but if a field extends into the Norweigan shelf, the
whole field should come under the joint development scheme. In the
Saudi Arabia-Sudan arrangement in the Red Sea, the joint develop-
26. See Valencia, Elements for Negotiations: An Introduction (a paper presented
at the Third East-West Center Workshop on the Hydrocarbon Potential of the South
China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development, Bangkok, Thailand) (Feb. 1985).
27. Miyoshi, Some Comments on Legal Aspects of Precedents for Joint Develop-
ment, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL AND POSSIBILITIES OF
JOINT DEVELOPMENT 1359 (M. Valencia ed. 1981).
28. A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 18, at 185.
29. Id.
30. See Ariffin, supra note 14.
31. Miyoshi, supra note 15, at 545.
32. Onorato, supra note 16, at 540.
33. 2"streng, supra note 17, at 560.
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ment area lies between the 1000 meter isobaths extending from each
coast and includes the main Red Sea brine deposits.3 4 In the minor-
ity opinion recommendation for Tunisia-Libya, the joint development
area would be that formed by lines deviating ten to fifteen degrees
on either side of an adjusted equidistance line.
3 5
Jurisdiction is clearly defined in the Japan-Korea,36 Thailand-Ma-
laysia,3 7 Iceland-Norway,38 and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait 39 agreements;
it is not so clearly defined in the Saudi Arabia-Sudan 40 arrangement.
In the Thailand-Malaysia arrangement, the governments jointly re-
tained sovereign rights to the area, and to regulation of customs,
fishing, navigation, hydrographic and oceanographic surveys, marine
pollution and security. The countries divided criminal jurisdiction by
a line equidistant between the two claim lines. 1
If the two countries have different contractual systems, such as
concessions versus production sharing, they must agree on one or the
other. Also difficult are questions of respective management rights,
taxation, and the allocation of financing. If the area is sufficiently
prospective, private companies could arrange the financing; but the
countries must agree to this arrangement as well as to the choice of
company. Thailand and Malaysia agreed to use a production-sharing
contract system even though Thailand was using a concession sys-
tem. The agreed terms for contractors were different than those in
use in either country.42 Under the South Korea-Japan arrangement,
each country names a concessionaire and each party collects taxes
from its own concessionaire.43 The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait scheme
uses concessions and OPEC tax rates, royalties, prices, and produc-
tion and maintenance costs. 4 The conciliation commission recom-
mended a joint venture contract for the Norway-Iceland arrange-
34. A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 18, at 185.
35. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 321.
36. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, supra note
22, arts. 19, 21.
37. See Polahan, supra note 14.
38. 0'streng, supra note 17, at 560.
39. Agreement Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone, supra note 23, arts.
3,7.
40. Miyoshi, supra note 27, at 1359.
41. See Polahan, supra note 14.
42. Ariffin, supra note 14, at 535; Ahmad, Agreement Solves Border Dispute, Pe-
troleum News, Feb. 1985, at 18.
43. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, supra note
22, arts. 4, 17.
44. Fesharaki, supra note 16, at 1329.
ment.45 The commission also recommended that each party
participate with a twenty-five percent share in joint ventures with oil
companies in the other's portion of the joint development area. How-
ever, it also recommended that if no commercial companies became
involved, and if the countries each financed exploration themselves in
their own portions of the joint development area, Norway should
carry Iceland's interest in Norway's portion. Similarly, Saudi Arabia
will bear all the operating expenses of the joint commission.4 6
In both the South Korea-Japan and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait land
agreements, 47 both parties nominate a concessionaire for the entire
subzone or area, and these concessionaires reach an operating agree-
ment between them, or in the South Korea-Japan agreement, by
drawing lots, if necessary.48 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed on one
operator for the offshore portion of the joint development area. The
countries made no specific reference to a contractual system in the
Saudi Arabia-Sudan agreement.
Countries engaging in joint development must also decide on the
duration of the agreement as well as on the reasons and procedures
for terminating the agreement. A short-term agreement (such as ten
years) may provide impetus to hasten exploration and development
but may also make investors shy away from a situation which will
obviously change. A long-term agreement (such as fifty years) pro-
vides a more stable investment climate but a longer commitment.
The Thailand-Malaysia agreement extends fifty years or until the
parties agree on delimitation. 49 Although the South Korea-Japan ar-
rangement also extends for fifty years, it can be terminated by mu-
tual consent if the parties recognize that the natural resources are no
longer exploitable.50 The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait agreement is of in-
definite duration, and either party can terminate it; however, a sixty
year concession in the area was given to one company. 5'
If a joint development body is established, the countries involved
must agree on the degree of the body's autonomy and authority. A
joint development body may be strong-a full legal person with pow-
ers to license, stipulate terms and exemptions, and enter into con-
tractual agreements with foreign companies-or it may be
45. Richardson, Anderson & Evenson, supra note 17, at 841.
46. Blissenbach & Nawab, supra note 18, at 98.
47. Onorato, supra note 16, at 540.
48. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, supra note
22, art. 6.
49. See Polahan, supra note 14.
50. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, supra note
22, art. 21.
51. "Either party shall be relieved of its obligations under the agreement if the
other cedes or alienates all or part of [its] equal rights to any other State or if the other
refuses to abide by [a] judgment made against it." Agreement Relating to the Partition
of the Neutral Zone, supra note 23, arts. 5, 22.
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weak-simply a liaison or consultative body between national oil
companies. The Thailand-Malaysia and Saudi Arabia-Sudan ar-
rangements produced joint authorities with strong powers, in con-
trast to the consultative status of the joint commissions produced by
the South Korea-Japan and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait arrangements.
5 2
In the Thailand-Malaysia case, the countries established a joint
authority to explore and exploit the nonliving natural resources of
the seabed and subsoil in the overlapping area.5 3 The joint authority
assumed all rights, responsibilities, and powers on behalf of both
parties in this regard for the development, control, and administra-
tion of the area. The assumption of the joint authority of such rights
and responsibilities was not supposed to affect or curtail the validity
of concessions or licenses hitherto issued or agreements or arrange-
ments made by either party. The joint authority has a constitution
and licensing powers; it can retain profit and it is taxable. It consists
of two joint chairpersons, one from each country and an equal num-
ber of members from each country. The joint authority has one legal
and two technical subcommittees.
The Saudi Arabia-Sudan agreement stipulated to the establish-
ment of a joint commission. The commission's responsibilities are to
survey and delimit the common zone, to carry out the requisite stud-
ies concerning the exploration and exploitation of the natural re-
sources there, to encourage specialized bodies to undertake explora-
tion activities in the zone, to look into applications for licenses and
concessions concerning exploration and exploitation in the common
zone, and specifically, to render a decision on the previous agreement
between Sudan and Preussag for exploration rights."
South Korea and Japan established the Japan-Republic of Korea
Joint Commission with a mandate to review operation of the agree-
ment and recommend action to the parties.5 5 The Commission has a
permanent secretariat and a subcommittee of experts. The parties
must approve the operating agreement between the concessionaires,
and the laws of each party apply to its concessionaire if its conces-
sionaire is the operator. One interesting variation is that the Japa-
nese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery must be con-
sulted in approving the operating agreement and can restrict
52. See Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Continental Shelf, supra
note 21; Agreement Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone, supra note 23.
53. See Polahan, supra note 14.
54. A. EL-HAKIM, supra note 18, at 186.
55. Miyoshi, supra note 15, at 548.
exploration and exploitation in designated fishing zones.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait established a joint operating committee
to supervise the concessionaires' field operators.58 The committee
studies projects and new licenses, contracts and concessions relating
to exploitation of shared natural resources and recommends action to
the respective ministers of natural resources; it can also sign con-
tracts. A permanent consultative committee was recommended in the
Tunisia-Libya case.57
Common elements which may later become important include:
unitization provisions for deposits which straddle the boundaries of
the joint development area; procedures and principles for conflict res-
olution such as direct negotiation; and provisions for, or governing, a
conciliation commission, or for bringing the matter to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Transfer of technology may be important,
particularly if there is a great gap between the technical levels of the
two entities, or if political difficulties exist between one of the part-
ners and the home country of interested companies, such as Vietnam
and the United States.
THE ROLE OF GEOLOGY IN JOINT DEVELOPMENT
ARRANGEMENTS
58
The geology, particularly the hydrocarbon or mineral potential, in
an area of overlapping claims, is the given natural reality upon
which legal and institutional edifices are built. Geology played a di-
rect role in the recommendations for joint development for Iceland
and Norway and the actual joint development arrangement between
Thailand and Malaysia. Geology played a more indirect role in the
arrangements between Sudan and Saudi Arabia and between Japan
and South Korea.
In the Iceland-Norway case, the finding that the Jan Mayen
Ridge is not a natural geological prolongation of Jan Mayen or of
Iceland, prompted the conciliation commission to discard the concept
of natural prolongation as a suitable basis for the solution of the
outstanding issues. In proposing a joint development scheme for Ice-
land and Norway, the conciliation commission gave special consider-
ation to the very low hydrocarbon potential of the shelf surrounding
Iceland, and to the Jan Mayen Ridge as the only possible area with
hydrocarbon potential. Indeed, the proposed joint development area
was specifically defined to include the major part of the Jan Mayen
Ridge. Because the potential is unknown, the commission suggested
56. Onorato, supra note 16, at 541.
57. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 321.
58. See Valencia, Geological Factors (a paper presented at the Third East-West
Center Workshop on the Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities
of Joint Development, Bangkok, Thailand) (Feb. 1985).
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that the Ridge be assessed at the earliest possible date through a
joint venture between Norway and Iceland.6 9
The commission noted that joint cooperation agreements must
consider the fact that investment and economic risks differ substan-
tially in each stage of exploration-predrilling, drilling, and develop-
ment. Because the unpromising geology and great water depths
make the financial risks very large, the commission suggested involv-
ing oil companies with deep-water experience in the drilling stage, or
alternatively, that Norway carry Iceland's interest. The commission
also recommended that, if necessary, Norway should carry Iceland's
interest in exploration in the joint development area north of Ice-
land's EEZ boundary but not vice versa for the area south of Ice-
land's EEZ boundary.60 The motivation for this recommendation
may be the slight extent and lower petroleum potential of the Jan
Mayen Ridge to the south of the boundary.
If the countries know or expect little or nothing of the hydrocar-
bon or mineral potential, it may be easier to divide a disputed area;
however, if they know or expect that some deposits exist in the area,
each claimant would be afraid of giving something away. The
United Nations Committee for the Coordination of Joint Prospecting
for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (UN-COOP) spon-
sored a survey which indicated a high probability that the continen-
tal shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific
oil reservoirs in the world. The initial stimulus for the overlapping
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese claims on their shared continental
shelf was this expectation of petroleum in the area.61
Since gas resources were known to exist in the area of overlap
between Thailand and Malaysia, both governments initially agreed
that it was in their best interests to exploit these resources as soon as
possible. In Malaysia, the national Electricity Board could use the
gas for its power station at Prai on the west coast of the peninsula.
Thailand would use it to help fuel its eastern seaboard industrial
complex. The details of establishing a joint authority thus became a
task of harmonizing the two sets of national economic policies, par-
ticularly the respective national policies on gas utilization. 2
At least three major brine deposits are known in waters about
59. Though due to the expense and expertise required, the commission felt Norway
should bear the costs of these surveys. Richardson, Anderson & Evensen, supra note 17,
at 841.
60. Id. at 838.
61. Park, supra note 15, at 1335.
62. Ariffin, supra note 14, at 536-37.
2000 meters deep in the Red Sea-the Atlantis II, Discovery and
Chain deeps. It was estimated that the Atlantis II deep contains
about 2.5 billion dollars worth of zinc, copper, lead, silver, and gold
at 1969 smelter prices.a Deposits in the adjacent Discovery deep
contain lower, but still abnormally high, metal concentrations. Be-
cause the Atlantis II deep was known to extend across the median
line, and because independent mining of the brines and semifluid
muds from each side of the median line would not be efficient, fair,
or profitable, the parties chose joint development.64 The Saudi Ara-
bia-Sudan agreement defined the common zone as the area beyond
the 1000 meter water depth off each country's shore, and it includes
these three deeps. Because the potential and its extent are still
largely undefined, the agreement stipulated to the establishment of a
joint commission to survey and delimit the common zone as well as
to study the feasibility of exploiting the mineral-bearing sediments in
such deep waters.
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION
How well has joint development worked? The Saudi Arabia-Ku-
wait arrangement is the only agreement which proceeded from polit-
ical agreement through the establishment of the necessary legal and
institutional organizations to successful exploration and development
of resources. The Sudan-Saudi Arabia agreement functioned suc-
cessfully through a three month prepilot mining test, but a commer-
cial project has not been implemented due to uncertainty about its
commercial viability. 6
5
The success of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia agreement is attributable
to (1) an "unwritten agreement" to keep oil out of political differ-
ences; (2) the practical desire of both parties to develop the oil fields
quickly; and (3) the small portion of total oil production by these
states from the joint development area.66 The two countries reached
this agreement relatively easily and because of the good relations
and practical attitude of the two countries the agreement works rela-
tively smoothly.
Perhaps pan-Arabism and familiarity with the Islamic concept of
63. See Bischoff & Manheim, Economic Potential of the Red Sea Heavy Metal
Deposits in HOT BRINES AND RECENT HEAVY METAL DEPOSITS IN THE RED SEA: A
GEOCHEMICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL ACCOUNT 535 (E. Degens & 0. Ross eds. 1968).
64. See Ostreng, Joint Development of Hydrocarbons in the South China Sea: Op-
portunities and Constraints, (a paper presented at the Third East-West Center Workshop
on the Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Develop-
ment, Bangkok, Thailand) (Feb. 1985).
65. Blissenbach & Nawab, supra note 18, at 394; Blissenbach, Technical and Eco-
nomic Aspects of Ocean Mining, 7, 11 (a paper presented at the Pacific Marine Mineral
Resources Training Course, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii) (June 1985).
66. Miyoshi, supra note 27, at 1360; Fesharaki, supra note 16, at 1329-30.
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mushaa (equal shares in joint and undivided property)67 were addi-
tional factors in the successful implementation. The agreement of
both countries on a single company (an operator who played a con-
structive and cooperative role in the exploration and development of
the resources) was also a definite contribution to its success. Further-
more, the discovery of actual resources in the joint development area
certainly cemented the effort.
The Iceland-Norway agreement is too recent to ascertain major
problems in its implementation; implementation of other joint devel-
opment agreements was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. From
the beginning, the South Korea-Japan joint development scheme was
a highly sensitive political issue which strained relations between the
coastal states. Although the agreement became effective in June
1978 and much drilling has occurred, the countries have yet to find
any petroleum. 8
The series of obstacles to the implementation of the Thai-Malay-
sian scheme is illustrative of the types of problems that can be en-
countered. Implementation of the Thailand-Malaysia agreement was
long delayed. Initially, Thailand accommodated Texas Pacific by al-
lowing it to keep its concession in the joint development area and
Malaysia agreed to this. Then Thailand's disagreement with Texas
Pacific over the pricing of gas in its "B" structure heated up. Conse-
quently, Thailand apparently wanted to revoke Texas Pacific's con-
cession in the joint development area to pressure the company in the
pricing disagreement. Texas Pacific, on the other hand, did not rec-
ognize the joint development authority.
The fact that a line of equidistance between Thailand and Malay-
sia would extend the boundary further south than the initial 1973
Thai claim and include the gas discovery in Pilong 1, produced a
disagreement between the Thai government and its concessionaire,
Triton Oil Company. When Malaysia agreed to include Pilong 1 in
the joint development area, Triton claimed that its concession bound-
ary moved with the international boundary and now extended south-
ward to the equidistant line. Thailand initially agreed to allow Triton
to include Pilong 1 in its concession area but internal Thai inter-
agency disagreement on this point followed. Indeed, in May 1985
government sources in Malaysia announced that the delayed imple-
mentation of the joint development agreement was due to Thai gov-
67. Onorato, supra note 16, at 540.
68. Park, supra note 15, at 1341.
ernment problems with contractors in the area.6"
Another problem was that Malaysia prefered to have one conces-
sionaire, not three as proposed by Thailand-Petronas, Triton, and
Texas Pacific. In an attempt to end the stalemate, Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir proposed to Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsula-
nonda that the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) enter a joint
venture with Petronas and international oil firms approved by both
governments. The foreign firms would then settle among themselves
their respective equities in the joint venture and choose a representa-
tive to negotiate with the joint development authority. However, the
Thai government may have been wary of this proposal because PTT
is not as experienced in petroleum exploration as Petronas. Also, Tri-
ton Oil Company formally rejected joint operation as economically
unfeasible. Despite these problems, Malaysia and Thailand have fi-
nally decided to move ahead with joint development of the area.
70
APPLICATIONS
There are two areas in Southeast Asia which are currently being
considered for joint development by the countries concerned: the
"Timor gap" between Indonesia and Australia,71 and the Natuna
Sea between Indonesia and Vietnam. 2
Figure 373
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69. Energy Asia, May 10, 1985.
70. Petroleum News, July 11, 1985; Ahmad, Agreement Solves Border Dispute,
Petroleum News, February, 1985, at 18.
71. Valencia & Miyoshi, Southeast Asian Seas: Joint Development of Hydrocar-
bons in Overlapping Claim Areas, 16 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 211 (1986); Timor Tax
Shelter, FAR EAST. EcON. REV. Aug. 22, 1985 at 1.
72. Energy Asia, Aug. 30, 1985.
73. Valencia, supra note 12, figure 5.11.
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74. Id. figure 5.6.
In 1971 and 1972 Australia and Indonesia concluded treaties that
established seabed boundaries extending from Papua-New Guinea in
the east to the waters between Ashmore Island and Pulau Roti in the
west. A gap of about 200 nautical miles was left in the boundary
south of eastern Timor, then a colony of Portugal. When Indonesia
formally incorporated eastern Timor in July 1976 the closing of the
gap became the subject of negotiations beginning in February 1979.
Geology is the main factor in the dispute. As to the boundary
south of Timor, Australia argues that two continental margins exist
between Timor and Australia-a more than 200 nautical mile wide
Australian margin to the south and a forty to seventy nautical mile
wide Indonesian margin to the north separated by the Timor
Troigh. Further, Australia claims that either the axis of the trough,
or, more generously, a line halfway down the Australian margin
should be the boundary. Indonesia claims that there is a single conti-
nental margin between the two countries with the Timor Trough just
a depression in this continuous feature, and that the boundary should
be the line equidistant between the two countries' territories. The
disputed area measures some 12,000 nautical square miles.
7 5
Australia proposed to Indonesia that they form a joint authority to
75. The "Timor gap" presents an interesting problem because it includes two pro-
spective basins, Timor and Bonaparte Gulf. Little is known of the petroleum potential of
the Timor basin although it is generally considered poor. However, in December 1983
there was supposedly the most significant find in Australia since the Bass Strait-Jabiru
IA in the Timor Sea (Vulcan sub-basin of the Browse basin). Test flows reached 7,500
barrels of oil per day (BOPD), and preliminary recoverable reserve estimates were at
least 200 million barrels. Petroleum News, Dec. 1983. However, the results of appraisal
wells were disappointing. These results, coupled with Australia's resources rent tax, and
the politics associated with it, could result in the postponement of production. Kelp, an-
other structure of interest, overlaps the northeastern portion of the "gap." Its oil reserves
were estimated to range from 500 million to five billion barrels of oil and fifty trillion
cubic feet of gas. BHI Maps Plans to Appraise Big Jabiru Oil Strike, Drill More Wild-
cats in Timor Sea, OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, Dec. 19, 1982 at 111-12.
An equidistance line would cut the core of the Bonaparte Gulf basin closure into a
two-thirds/one-third proportion in favor of Australia, with Kelp falling to Indonesia. A
continuation of the agreed continental shelf boundaries to close the "Timor gap" would
place the- entire Bonaparte Gulf basin and Kelp in Australian jurisdiction. The basin is
also divided almost in half by the northwest-southeast boundary between Australia's
Northern Territory and the State of Western Australia. Several holders of Australian
contracts have acreage beyond the equidistant line: Tricentrol (awarded in 1980), Wood-
side Petroleum and Aquitaine in the Northern Territory portion, and Woodside Petro-
leum and Mesa Australia/West Australia in the Western Australia portion. The Wood-
side Petroleum and the Aquitaine acreages extend to the hypothetical connection across
the "gap," which is halfway down the Australian continental "margin," thus overlapping
into the Timor basin.
The Timor basin would be completely within the Indonesian "shelf" if the equidistance
line were to become the agreed boundary. If the middle of the Australian margin is used
as a guide to complete the "gap," a small portion of the core of the Timor basin would
accrue to Australia, which already leased it for exploration. Former Portuguese Timor
leased the area extending to the hypothetical "gap" connection, and thus the bulk of the
basin to Oceanic.
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administer the disputed area or at least those areas with the highest
oil and gas potential."6 In a joint development agreement, Australia
and Indonesia could agree that the boundaries of the joint develop-
ment area are the lines connecting the two agreed boundaries, the
equidistance line and two longitudes connecting these lines.77 Given
this agreement, the line connecting the agreed continental shelf
,boundaries could be set as the continental shelf boundary in the
area, and Australian criminal jurisdiction and defense could prevail
in the joint development area.
The joint authority established by the federal governments of In-
donesia and Australia, or their assignees could be strong, but it must
accommodate the interests of the Australian States of Western Aus-
tralia and the Northern Territory, possibly through a division of
powers similar to that between the Regional Fishery Management
Councils and the federal government in the United States under the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.78 Pari Petroleum which
operates in both Australia and Indonesia might satisfy all parties
concerned. The contract could be based on the Indonesian produc-
tion-sharing model which is more favorable to oil companies than
current Australian tax regulations. The oil companies would bear all
the risk. To cement and stabilize relations between the two and allay
suspicions, the agreement could be long-term. Conflict resolution
could be by conciliation, although recourse to arbitration should not
be ruled out.
In the Natuna Sea, Indonesia and Vietnam have disputed an area
in the west, which includes the northeastern West Natuna basin;79 in
76. Richardson, Drawing the Seabed Line, FAR EAST. EcoN. REV., Oct. 3, 1978, at
79; Talks with Indonesia on Fishing, Seabed to Reopen, The Weekend Australian, Dec.
27-28, 1980, at 9, col. 3; Richardson, Tying up Timor's Loose Ends, FAR EAST. ECON.
REV., Jan. 5, 1979, at 44.
77. See supra figure 3 accompanying note 73.
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1985).
79. The portion of the northeastern West Natuna basin includes a small part of a
three-second core (two-way reflection time; one second approximately equivalent to one
kilometer of sediment) and another three second thick sediment pod aligned northeast-
southwest; both have been drilled once with dry holes. Conoco discovered oil in Block B,
but reserves are only twenty million barrels, and the discovery is unlikely to be declared
commercial. The Ikan Pari I-A flowed 6,085 BOPD from two zones and 2,953 BOPD
from a confirmation well. Energy Asia, Oct. 14, 1983; Petroleum News, Aug. 1983. Mar-
athon was given approval to proceed with development of its KH field in the Kakap block
and commercial production at 22,000 BOPD is expected in 1986. Petroleum News, July
1983. In late 1981 Conoco and Pertamina announced the discovery of "highly signifi-
cant" natural gas. The Anoa-1 well flowed at 4,300 BOPD and 1.7 MMCFD. Energy
Asia, Jan. 1, 1982. In April 1982 Sumatera Gulf Oil reported a significant discover, of
high-gravity clean oil in Block A. The Tembang-1 well flowed at 325 million cubic feet
the north, the southern fringes of the Saigon basin;80 in the center,
the extension of the Natuna arch;8' and in the east, much of the
"South China Sea Block A, Eastern Part. '8 2
The disputed area is divided east-west.8 3 The eastern area appears
gas-prone whereas the western area appears somewhat oil-prone. In
the early negotiating sessions it was allegedly proposed that Indone-
sia have jurisdiction over areas in the West Natuna basin which
Pertamina has contracted since 1970 to United States oil companies.
These oil companies are currently exploring for, or developing,
known reserves in the basin. It was also allegedly proposed that Viet-
nam obtain the northeastern portion (the South China Sea Block A,
Eastern Part) of the overlap. The two sides were getting closer to a
solution and the area in dispute was diminishing, although the north-
eastern portion remained a problem. 4 In October 1985 the two
countries were discussing joint development.8 5
The exact area still in dispute is unknown. The following scenario
assumes that the area in dispute is that situated between the conti-
nental shelf boundary claim made by South Vietnam in 1971 and a
line equidistant between the northernmost Natuna islands and the
southernmost Vietnamese islands. It is not necessary to delimit a
boundary, but if one is deemed desirable, the boundary could be the
line equidistant between the two claims. An east-west line would be
logical given the north-south geographic relationship of the two
countries and would fairly divide the oil-prone west, gas-prone east
and unprospective central portions, in contrast to a north-south line
per day (MMCFD), Energy Asia, Jan. 1, 1982.
80. Little is known of this basin. Seismic data suggest a northeast trending basin
which terminates to the west and southwest against the extension of the Khorat Swell.
Sediment thickness is 3000 to 4500 meters. Oil and gas were discovered in the southern
portion of the basin bordering the disputed area. See Du Bois, Review of Principal Hy-
drocarbon-Bearing Basins of the South China Sea Area, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: HY-
DROCARBON POTENTIAL AND POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT 1127 (M. Valencia
ed. 1981).
81. The central portion of the disputed area is an extension of the nose of the
Natuna arch where sediment thicknesses are about one second, and thus, unprospective.
However, thicknesses increase to two seconds across the arch in the northern part of the
disputed area, offering some possibilities. The Vietnamese boundary claim line runs lati-
tudinally across the middle of this basement high.
82. The "South China Sea Block A, Eastern Part" is a transition zone between the
Saigon basin and the outer basinal area. Sediments generally thicken eastwards without
large closure. Six dry holes were drilled in Indonesian concessions in the disputed area
before the reunification of Vietnam, contrasting with the Dua and other discoveries north
of the Indonesian claim line. Azienda Generale Italian Petroli made a significant gas
discovery approximately 250 kilometers north-northeast of Natuna Island near the north-
ern limit of the thick pod of Plio-Pleistocene sediments referred to as the "Outer Basinal
Area." The AL-IX well reported gas-in-place of 130 to 140 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of
which 80% is said to consist of inerts, leaving 28 TCF. Energy Asia, Jan. 1982.
83. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
84. Sea Dispute Evaporates, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., May 15, 1981, at 9.
85. Petroleum News, Oct. 1985.
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along the crest of the unprospective Natuna Arch.86 Rather than a
full jurisdictional boundary, this east-west line could divide national
authority for security and criminal purposes.
Given the tenuous relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam,
any joint commission should have consultative status only and rec-
ommend action to the respective governments. The area has already
been the site of successful exploration by private companies-Gulf,
Marathon and Amoseas-all United States companies. Thus, there
is no need for the states to bear exploration expenses; however, Indo-
nesia might consider carrying Vietnam's interest for the operation of
the joint development commission. Although the more experienced
country, Indonesia, should perhaps take the lead in managing devel-
opment of the area, the training of Vietnamese counterparts should
be a first priority.
Given the antipathy between Vietnam and the United States, the
contract holders should be non-American, perhaps French, German,
Italian, or Canadian, all of which have recently operated in Vietnam.
The contract could be on the sophisticated Indonesian production-
sharing model with all risks borne by the oil companies. The agree-
ment must be sufficiently long-term to bolster the confidence of the
companies and the countries in the stability of the agreement, but it
must also be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changing condi-
tions without breaking under tension.
CONCLUSION
International joint development is the common exercise of sover-
eign rights by two or more states for the purpose of exploration and
exploitation of the nonliving resources of an area under national ju-
risdiction. Countries may establish an international joint develop-
ment zone on a continental shelf or in an EEZ that has been delim-
ited, or pending delimitation. Minimally, the joint development
agreement should specify the area covered by the agreement, the ju-
risdictions to be applied within the zone, organizations which will
manage the area, and the laws under which the mining licenses will
be issued. The determination of the applicable contractual law can
be left to the private companies operating within the zone, or to the
86. The Natuna Arch is a tectonic and structural high composed of Mesozoic
rocks. It extends northward from the Kuching area of Borneo, past Natuna Island termi-
nating against the Saigon basin. Its northern flank consists of complexly faulted base-
ment rocks overlain by less than 3000 meters of sediment. Du Bois, supra note 80, at
1123.
states concerned. Resources in the zone may be explored and ex-
ploited in various ways such as unitization, production-sharing, or
scientific cooperation. Good political relations, practical mindedness,
discovery of actual deposits, and cooperative private companies favor
successful implementation of joint development arrangements. Inter-
national joint development is a useful concept which has applicabil-
ity as pressure mounts to develop oil and mineral resources in areas
of jurisdictional overlap.
